Published 2017-06-10
Keywords
- Chilean Superintendency of Securities and Insurance (SSI),
- conflict of interests,
- duplicity of roles,
- Stockbrokers,
- Stakeholder theory
How to Cite
Abstract
Recently, the credibility of the financial system has been damaged by important and successive scandals. Stockbrokers have had an active and little known role within these scandals. This paper aims to show the different situations in which stockbrokers have been involved, describing conflicts of interest and duplicity of roles. These require special regulations, but which at present are not being adequately addressed and controlled. According to the proposed methodological design, the influence of banks and economic groups is observed. Stockbrokers are instruments of their influence in the Chilean economy. The duplication of roles through the use of their own portfolios by the Chilean
Stockbrokers is marginal. However, Larraín Vial CB is an actor in the market that systematically uses this possibility. Few fines and sanctions are imposed, even though these financial scandals have been studied expost, by the regulatory body. It is suggested that the prevention mechanisms need to be strengthened by the Chilean SSI, given that if these are not clear they are prejudicial to minority shareholders and the accountability system.
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References
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